We interpret the social identity literature and examine its economic implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well de…ned social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a con ‡ict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both unbiased and biased players. Biased players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and speci…cation of the biased player is motivated by the social identity literature. For unbiased players, group membership has no payo¤ relevant consequences. We show that the unbiased players can contribute to the con ‡ict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence.
Introduction
Experimental research has found that placing people into social groups can cause some to have a preference for discrimination: favoring members of their own group at the expense of members of other groups. 1 Indeed, this is the primary insight of the vast literature on social identity, which we describe in more detail below. In this paper, we model a heterogeneous population, partially composed of agents who behave as described by this literature. The interesting questions are then, what can we say about agents with no such preference for discrimination and what can we say about outcomes in such a society. We present a model in which each player lives for two periods and in each is matched to play a reduced form bargaining stage game. In each stage game, both players have a better material outcome by agreeing to a distribution than by not agreeing. Also, in the stage game, each player has a better material outcome by securing the larger share of the surplus. We assume that every agent is a member of one of two social groups and that this status is observable.
Players are assumed to be either unbiased or biased. Unbiased players are motivated entirely by material payo¤s. In other words, group membership contains no payo¤ relevant consequences for unbiased players. By contrast, a biased player has payo¤s which are a¤ected by group membership. Consistent with the social identity literature, we make the following assumptions regarding biased players. When matched with a member of their own group (an ingroup match), biased players are cooperative. When matched with a member of the other group (an outgroup match) biased players intransigently destroy surplus rather than accept a payo¤ lower than the outgroup opponent.
We …nd that when preferences are unobservable, a social con ‡ict can emerge. In particular, we show that the con ‡ict does not require an entire population of biased agents. Rather, unbiased players can contribute to the con ‡ict through the destruction of surplus in outgroup matches by mimicking biased agents. Unbiased agents might …nd it bene…cial to behave as such in order to obtain a reputation for being biased and hence secure more favorable outcomes in the future. 2 Our …rst main result (Proposition 1) shows that the ine¢ciency in a society tends to be increasing in the heterogeneity of that society. Our second main result (Proposition 2) shows that ine¢ciency is increasing in the inequitability of the environment. These results relate to the following two strands of literature.
Researchers have examined the relationship between social heterogeneity and economic conditions. For instance, Easterly and Levine (1997) , Mauro (1995) , Posner (2004) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that measures of heterogenous populations are negatively related to economic development. We contend that our model contributes to the understanding of this stylized fact. As individuals of di¤erent social groups compete for material bene…ts, disagreement and ine¢ciency can result. We demonstrate the positive relationship between our measure of social heterogeneity and social con ‡ict as measured by such ine¢ciency. 3 Additionally, researchers have noted the relationship between the level of social con ‡ict and the inequitability of the environment. Falk and Zweimuller (2005) show a relationship between local economic conditions and aggressive behavior. Speci…cally, the authors show that higher local unemployment rates (and hence, larger probabilities of inequitable outcomes) lead to higher incidences of right-wing extremist crimes. It is important to note that the authors …nd that it is the threat of a worse economic position, and not the economic position per se, which induces this con ‡ict. Therefore, we interpret these …ndings as evidence of a positive relationship between the inequitability of the environment 4 and social con ‡ict. There is also a large sociological literature relating various forms of social con ‡ict to the inequitability of the environment. For instance, Olzak (1992) …nds a positive relationship between the inequitability of the environment and ethnic con ‡ict, as measured by violent events. 5 Our model also provides an explanation for these …ndings. Speci…cally we show that the amount of social con ‡ict is increasing in the inequitability of the environment.
Our speci…cation of the biased player is motivated by the social identity literature. A very large literature has found that placing people into groups is a su¢cient condition for discriminating behavior. 6 Of particular interest is the …nding that people tend to prefer better material outcomes for ingroup members than outgroup members and that they are also prepared to create ine¢ciencies (destroy surplus) to secure this outcome. For instance, the discriminating person would prefer to allocate $6 to an ingroup member and $2 to an outgroup member rather than $5 to each. Tajfel et. al. (1971) …nd that these preferences imply the maximization of the payo¤ di¤erence between the groups. 7 In other words, the discriminating person will accept some ine¢ciency in allocating resources in order to secure a better material outcome for the ingroup.
3 Also see Vigdor (2002) for a paper with a similar goal. 4 What we refer to as "inequitability of the environment" sociologists refer to as "competition." Sociologists de…ne competition to be the threat of a worse economic position. Here, we believe this term to be inappropriate as "competition" has a di¤erent meaning to economists. 5 Lubbers and Scheepers (2001), Scheepers et. al. (2002) , Quillian (1995 Quillian ( , 1996 also …nd a positive relationship between the inequitability of the environment and social con ‡ict, as measured by prejudiced beliefs. Olzak, Shanahan, and West (1994) …nd the relationship in the context of school busing in U.S. cities. 6 A very small sample of this enormous literature would include Sumner 1906 , Murdock (1949 ), Sherif et. al. (1961 , Tajfel (1970 ), Tajfel et. al. (1971 , Tajfel (1978) , Tajfel and Turner (1979) , Kramer and Brewer (1984) , Tajfel and Turner (1986) , Dawes, Van De Kragt, and Orbell (1988) . 7 There is, however, no consensus on this statement. Messick and Mackie (1984 pg. 64 ) point out that some authors …nd that discrimination can come in the form that the joint allocation is maximized "as long as the ingroup gets more than the outgroup." This perspective also su¢ces to justify our speci…cation of behavioral players.
We view the social identity literature as providing speci…c justi…cation for our model. First we assume the formation of social groups based on some shared characteristic and that membership in these groups might a¤ect the preferences of some, but not all. Secondly, we assume that all players are nice in an ingroup match and in an outgroup match, some players are not nice in that they pick the action which maximizes the di¤erence between the groups. The condition that some people prefer ingroup members to have better outcomes than outgroup members does not have bite in our ingroup matches. Therefore, we assume that biased players are nice in ingroup matches.
Related Literature
Recently economists have devoted attention to modeling identity. 8 For instance, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) present a general model of identity and economics. The authors assume that an agent's identity related preferences are a¤ected by the actions of others, therefore their notion of a social group is ‡uid. By contrast, we model a social con ‡ict between well de…ned social groups which are not ‡uid and not de…ned by behavior. Similar to Akerlof and Kranton, the behavior in our model is optimal from the perspective of the agent. However, the behavior in both models can be suboptimal in other ways: in our model discrimination leads to ine¢ciencies and in Akerlof and Kranton agents can engage in destructive activities. 9 Insights on identity have been recently appearing in the experimental economics literature. 10 For instance, Ferraro and Cummings (2007) describe the results of an experiment where subjects play an anonymous version of the ultimatum game, although subjects know the distribution of the ethnicity of potential opponents. The authors …nd that the lowest o¤er which a subject would accept as a responder is decreasing in the fraction of players of the same ethnicity. We the work on identity within the experimental economics literature as supporting our assumptions of the model.
There exists a literature which formally models social con ‡ict, however each strand focuses on di¤erent issues than we do here. 11 For instance, Fearon and Laitin (1996) and Nakao (2009) focus on the role in which ingroup policing helps to maintain social order by avoiding social con ‡ict between groups. Speci…cally, it is assumed that information is di¤erentially better for the histories of ingroup members than outgroup members and that no agents have a preference for discrimination. By contrast, we examine the implications of the preference for discrimination. Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Bridgman (2008) and Strulik (2008) also model the relationship between social heterogeneity and con ‡ict. These papers are able to make nuanced statements regarding outcomes in such a society, however groups are modeled as cohesive units. By contrast we assume a rather general stage game and model each unbiased 8 See Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) for early theoretical work on identity and discrimination. 9 For more on identity in economics, see Sobel (2004) , Kirman and Teschl (2004) and Davis (2006) See Lindqvist and Ostling (2009) and Shayo (2009) for the application of identity to redistribution.
1 0 See Ahmed (2007), Charness et. al. (2007) , Goette et. al. (2006) and Guth et. al. (2008) . Also see, Chen and Li (2008) who use econometric techniques to estimate the form of social preferences involving identity.
1 1 Also see Caselli and Coleman (2006) , Dion (1997) , Ray (2008, 2009 ) and Robinson (2001) .
player as maximizing individual material payo¤s. Finally, Orbell, Zeng and Mulford (1996) use computer simulation techniques to model social con ‡ict as driven by individual incentives.
Like Basu (2005) , we model social con ‡ict in a heterogenous society 12 containing some members with a preference for discrimination. Additionally, we both show how the presence of these types can induce those without such a preference to discriminate. Basu models a one-shot game with multiple equilibria in material payo¤s which can be Pareto ranked. The presence of types with a preference for discrimination can cause those without such a preference to select the action associated with the Pareto dominated equilibrium. By contrast our stage game has a single equilibrium in material payo¤s. Actions other than the equilibrium actions are played only for the purpose of improving future outcomes. Therefore, in Basu the presence of special types of agents induces a more defensive posture in other agents, in our paper the resulting behavior is a more aggressive posture. In other words, the ine¢ciencies in Basu are driven by fear of aggressive behavior of the opponent and in our model the ine¢ciencies are driven by the aggressive behavior of unbiased agents induced by material gains. Rohner (2008) also introduces a game theoretic model which seeks to link the social composition of a heterogenous population with economic outcomes in that population. Like we do here, Rohner presents a reputation model where types are unobservable. However, in Rohner's model no agent has a preference for discrimination but rather di¤erential access to information. While agents in our model wish to obtain a reputation for biased preferences, agents in Rohner's model wish to avoid obtaining a reputation for toughness. The di¤erences also include that Rohner uses contest functions, we use a reduced bargaining game; Rohner's stage game is in…nitely repeated whereas ours is only repeated twice; and in our paper information regarding histories is very precise and it is very coarse in Rohner. Despite these di¤erences, our main results are relatively congruent. Our Proposition 1 shows that the economic ine¢ciency in a society tends to be increasing in the heterogeneity of that society. Similarly, Proposition 4 of Rohner shows that social tension is increasing in (what we refer to as) the heterogeneity of the population. Given the large di¤erences between Rohner and the present paper, it is somewhat surprising that, roughly, we come to the same conclusion regarding social heterogeneity and economic outcomes.
The Model
We study a sequential chicken stage game repeated for T = 2 periods. The stage game payo¤s are described by the following game tree T :
where b is strictly larger than one. 13 In each repetition of the stage game, player 1 chooses an action of either Hawk (H) or Dove (D). In the event that player 1 selects H, player 2 chooses between H and D. We do not allow transfers between agents.
There is a continuum of players i 2 [0; 1]. Each player is a member of exactly one of two social groups. This group identity is described by the social identity parameter 2 (0:5; 1). All agents such that i 2 [0; ] = M are in the majority group and all agents such that j 2 ( ; 1] = m are in the minority group. In each period, agents are matched to play the stage game where the matching probability is uniform on the population. In each match, the probability of being a player 1 is identical to that of being a player 2. If two players i; j such that i 2 M and j 2 m are matched, we refer to this as an outgroup match, otherwise it is an ingroup match.
In each group, there are two types of players: unbiased and biased. The unbiased players have their payo¤s described by T . Biased players always play H in an outgroup match and have payo¤s as described by T in an ingroup match. Group membership is observable however the preferences of the opponent are unobservable. The ex-ante fraction of biased players, in each group, is . The entire game is therefore described by = (T , b; ; ):
To simplify the subsequent analysis, note that in every ingroup match the subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game is played: player 1 plays H and the player 2 plays D. No player has an incentive to deviate. Player 2 gains no future bene…t by playing H. Player 1, knowing this, plays H. Therefore, we take the ingroup matches as given and focus exclusively on the behavior in outgroup matches.
Player i's action is denoted a 2 fH; Dg = A. We de…ne the condition of the match as c 2 f1; Hg = C. Here c = 1 indicates that i is a player 1. Likewise, c = H indicates 1 3 All of the following would hold if instead we exchanged b and 1 with x and 1 x respectively where x = b b+1 > 1 2 .
that i is a player 2 whose opponent played H. The history of the matched opponent is perfectly observed. We can write the relevant set of histories for player i in the …rst period as h i 2 H i = fI; H1; D1; HH; DH; Eg. The …rst element refers to an ingroup match. The following two elements refer to playing H and D as a player 1. Likewise the next two refer to playing H and D as a player 2 against a player 1 who played H. The last element refers to a player 2 matched against a player 1 who played D. We de…ne the set of player histories H D in which the action of D has been observed in an outgroup match
A …rst period strategy for player i is a mapping i 1 : C ! A and the second period strategy as a player 1 is a mapping i 2 : C H j ! A. We de…ne i = i 1 i 2 . We also de…ne = i2[0;1] i . We denote i ( ) as the probability that H is played. After a history of h i the posterior belief that player i is biased is denoted p i (h i ). Players maximize the sum of expected utility payo¤s. We assume no discounting. In period 2, for a given history h j 1 and condition c, player i's expected payo¤ from the pro…le of strategies is de…ned to be U i 2 ( jc; h j ). In period 1, for a given c, player i's expected payo¤ from the pro…le of strategies in periods 1 and 2 is de…ned to be U i 1 ( jc).
Recall that our goal is to model a general con ‡ict situation with as few asymmetries as possible. Speci…cally, we designed the model in such a way that the groups are as meaningless as possible. As such, we have assumed that each group has an identical fraction of biased players ( ). We have also assumed that the probabilities that an agent is designated as a player 1 and player 2 are equal for agents in each group. Despite these symmetry assumptions, we still observe the ine¢ciencies associated with a social con ‡ict. Indeed our assumptions regarding are weaker than warranted by the experimental evidence. For instance, Cho and Connelley (2002) …nd that the competitiveness of an outgroup setting is associated with a higher degree of identi…cation of subjects. We interpret this …nding as evidence of a positive relationship between and b. Although we do not assume such a relationship, our results would be stronger if we did.
In our solution concept, we use the following de…nition:
Condition ( ) requires beliefs to be updated in an intuitive manner. On or o¤-theequilibrium path, it requires that if player j ever played D in an outgroup match, opponents ascribe probability 0 to j being biased. Now we de…ne the notion of equilibrium which we will use throughout the paper.
De…nition 2 A strategy pro…le is a Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SP BE) if:
Hg and h j 2 H j (iii) for any i; k 2 M and any j; l 2 m; i = k and j = l Furthermore, beliefs p j (h j ) must satisfy condition ( ) and are updated using Bayes Rule wherever possible, for all j and h 2 H.
De…nition 2 is a slightly more restrictive version of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (P BE). Condition (i) requires that period 1 actions are optimal, as both a player 1 and 2, given any set of initial beliefs. Condition (ii) is the analogous requirement for period 2. Condition (iii) requires that every member of a group use the same strategy. Note that in equilibrium, this requirement only bites when players are indi¤erent between actions. In such a case, condition (iii) allows us to break ties in a manner consistent with a social identity interpretation. Condition (iii) also allows us to refer to strategies for the group rather than for the individual. For instance, M 1 (1) refers to the strategy of the majority group as a …rst period player 1. Finally, we require that beliefs are updated using Bayes Rule wherever possible and that a player who selected D in the …rst period is known with certainty to be unbiased.
Finally note that we speak of aggressive discrimination whenever the actions (H; H) are observed. This terminology is appropriate as the outcome (H; H) never occurs in equilibrium in an ingroup match. More generally we refer to a play of H (in any period) as aggressive play. Note that all unbiased players always play D as a second player in period 2 ( i 2 (H; h j ) = 0 for all h j 2 H and i 2 fm; M g). As there is no confusion, we write i 2 (1; h j ) as i 2 (h j ) in order to conserve notation.
Again, note that in a game without biased players ( = 0), the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is to play H as a player 1 and play D against H as a player 2. When > 0, there are conditions under which an unbiased player will optimally destroy surplus in order to secure a reputation for being a biased player. This destruction of surplus can take one of the following two forms.
De…nition 3 Agent i exhibits Reputation as a Player 2 (P 2) if the SP BE is such that:
If player i exhibits P 2; he will play H with positive probability in response to a player 1 selecting H, even though playing H means forgoing a certain payo¤ of 1 in order to have more favorable future matches. However, another type of reputation can be observed when the agent is a player 1.
De…nition 4 Agent i exhibits Reputation as a Player 1 (P 1) if the SP BE is such that:
If player i exhibits P 1; he will play H with positive probability as a player 1, even though playing D would yield a larger expected payo¤ in the …rst period. In order to compare the two de…nitions, note that if an agent displays P 2 then the player exchanges a …rst period stage game payo¤ of 1 for a payo¤ of 0. However, a player 1 selecting H could be myopically optimal if the matched opponent is su¢ciently likely to play D. In this case, we could not claim that the player is motivated by reputation concerns. Therefore, we require the second condition so that the …rst period action does not maximize …rst period payo¤s.
The following lemma states that P 1 and P 2 will never both occur in any SP BE.
Lemma 1 There are no parameter values such that if one player exhibits P 1 (P 2) then any player exhibits P 2 (P 1).
Proof: See Appendix.
To see that parameter values cannot be such that P 1 and P 2 are both present, note that if a player exhibits P 1 then the fraction of biased players is su¢ciently high, 0 , otherwise the de…nition of P 1 cannot be satis…ed. The smallest such fraction of biased players 0 makes the exhibition of P 2 by any player unpro…table. Similarly, if a player exhibits P 2 then it is su¢ciently unlikely that a future opponent is a biased player, 00 , otherwise P 2 would not be pro…table. However the largest such fraction of biased players 00 renders playing H as a player 1 myopically optimal, thus the agent cannot exhibit P 1.
Comparative Statics: Social Fragmentation and Inequitable Environments
In this section, we present our main results. We examine the relationship between social con- ‡ict, as measured by ine¢ciency, and social heterogeneity. We also examine the relationship between social con ‡ict, as measured by ine¢ciency, and inequitable environments. These results provide an individually rational explanation for the relevant empirical results.
Many authors use the fragmentation index, de…ned as the probability that two randomly selected people are from di¤erent social groups, as a measure of social heterogeneity. In the present context, this would imply that the fragmentation index is 2 (1 ). By contrast we use 1 as a measure of social heterogeneity. Both measures are maximized on [0; 0:5] at = 0:5 and are strictly decreasing in . Furthermore, nothing is gained by considering the more complicated measure of heterogeneity.
To formally state our results, we …rst de…ne the total e¢ciency loss in the SP BE as I(b; ). This quantity is the probability of aggressive discrimination ((H; H) outcomes) in either period multiplied by the total material surplus which could have been achieved, b + 1:
We state I(b; ) as explicitly depending on and b but not on (fraction of biased players), as we will shortly explore the implications of varying the …rst two but not the last parameter. Furthermore, is hard to measure and to our knowledge, no empirical papers have studied the matter.
De…nition 5 I( ; b) is the total e¢ciency loss in the SP BE :
Note that I is not a measure of social welfare. Speci…cally, I is not the average of the utilities of the agents in the game. The value of I is intended to provide a measure of the material payo¤s not captured in the bargaining procedure. While it is often assumed that a social planner seeks to maximize the utility of every agent, with standard assumptions regarding utility, this condition is equivalent to maximizing the material surplus of each agent. However, in our case, these two notions are not identical. Indeed, to be consistent with the spirit of the social planner, we would seek to maximize the volume of trade rather than accommodate the discriminatory preferences of the biased players. The value of I provides a measure of the material outcomes in the population and we therefore consider it to be the most appropriate objective function.
The next result shows that there exists a level of heterogeneity such that for every smaller value of heterogeneity, I is strictly increasing in heterogeneity. Although the statement of Proposition 1 is rather intricate, it roughly states that ine¢ciency tends to be increasing in heterogeneity. We now state this formally.
Proposition 1 For all (b, ), there exists a 1 > 0 such that for all 1 < 1 ine¢ciency I is strictly increasing in 1 .
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows: when heterogeneity increases, the occurrence of outgroup matches also increases. Within these outgroup matches are matches involving only biased players and matches involving at least one unbiased player. Obviously, in the biased-only matches, an increase in heterogeneity will, by assumption, imply a greater ine¢ciency. Also, matches involving exactly one unbiased player will imply a greater inef-…ciency unless every unbiased agent always plays D. However, unbiased-only matches will also exhibit ine¢ciency if either player exhibits P 1 or P 2 and this ine¢ciency is increasing in heterogeneity.
To better understand the nuanced statement of the proposition we consider the four possibilities of the relationship between ine¢ciency and 1 for a given b and . In each of these four cases, there is no ine¢ciency at 1 = 0. A particularly simple case is illustrated by Figure 1 . Here b and are such that for every 1 , ine¢ciency is strictly and continuously increasing.
FIGURE 1 HERE
As illustrated in Figure 1 , there exist values of b and for which a single qualitative SP BE describes the behavior for all values of heterogeneity. However, it could also be the case that, as heterogeneity increases, a qualitatively di¤erent SP BE can occur. As 1 gets larger, the minority reputation becomes less valuable and the majority reputation becomes more valuable. Therefore, only two types of such "jumps" can occur as 1 becomes larger. Either the majority does not exhibit reputation for any heterogeneity whereas the minority exhibits reputation for small 1 and for large values does not exhibit reputation (Figure 2) . Or it can be that the minority always exhibits reputation and for small 1 the majority does not display reputation and for large values, the majority does ( Figure 3) .
FIGURE 2 HERE FIGURE 3 HERE
As illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3 , there exist parameter values such that ine¢ciency strictly increases almost everywhere from 1 2 (0; 0:5) with at most one point of discontinuity. In other words, for these values there does not exist an interior extrema. However, there also exists parameter values where such an interior extrema exists. Figure 4 illustrates a possible relationship.
FIGURE 4 HERE
Here in Figure 4 , for 1 less than 0:49 the minority displays P 2 and the majority does not. However, for 1 greater than 0:49 neither the majority nor the minority displays P 2. There is an interior maximum of ine¢ciency at 0:485. Therefore, for such a case to hold we need the interior maximum on the ine¢ciency function where only m displays P 2 to occur at a smaller degree of heterogeneity than the point of discontinuity. Although the extremum is always "close" to 0:5, it still remains that there is a small region for which ine¢ciency is decreasing in heterogeneity. 14 In order to relate the …gures to the proposition, note that in the cases of Figures 1 and 3 ine¢ciency is everywhere strictly increasing in heterogeneity, therefore 1 = 0:5. In the case of Figure 2, 1 is at the point of downward continuity. And in Figure 4 , 1 is at the interior maximum. 15 This completes our discussion of the relationship between social con ‡ict and social heterogeneity. We now turn to the relationship between social con ‡ict and the inequitability of the environment. We show that increasing the inequitability of the environment leads to an increase in social con ‡ict as measured by ine¢ciency. 16 Proposition 2 I is strictly increasing in b.
The map I b+1 is a function in b with …ve points of upward discontinuity. The intuition behind the result is as follows: as b increases, playing H becomes more attractive. This leads to an increase in the probability which unbiased agents play H and this increases ine¢ciency. Figure 5 illustrates a typical relationship between I b+1 and b. 17
FIGURE 5 HERE
Our model provides an explicit account of the individual behavior which drives the social con ‡ict. Speci…cally, the presence of biased players means that ine¢ciency is increasing in the inequitability of the environment. Furthermore, Proposition 2 is free of the built-in ine¢ciency present in Proposition 1. Any increases beyond the smallest value of I b+1 in Figure  5 are driven exclusively by the behavior of the unbiased agents.
Characterization of SPBE
We now characterize the SP BE. We start by characterizing the SP BE where b is small and therefore neither group displays P 2 (Proposition 3). We then characterize the SP BE where b is intermediate and therefore the minority group displays P 2 but the majority does not (Proposition 4). Subsequetntly we characterize the SP BE where b is large and therefore both groups displays P 2 (Proposition 5). 18
1 6 The proof is available from the author upon request. 1 7 To better understand the values for which the SP BE is not unique, see Proposition 8. 1 8 In each of these propositions the SP BE is unique. In the appendix, we characterize the SP BE where it is not unique.
(iv) > m then the unique SP BE is such that for all i 2 fm; M g, i
Proposition 3 states that for small b, neither group will display P 2 because it will not be pro…table to play H as a player 2 in order to enter the second period with a posterior even as high as 1. Descriptively, for small ; (case (i)) both groups play aggressively as a player 1. The only situation where the strategy of playing H as a player 1 is not SP BE is when the second period opponent played H in the …rst period. This is because a history of HH is the only history leading to a posterior greater than b 1 b . In both periods, the optimal strategy turns out to be the one which myopically maximizes payo¤s. For case (ii), both groups display P 1. In the …rst period, both groups play H as a player 1 rather than D, despite the fact that the latter yields a higher stage game payo¤. Here, D is myopically superior to H despite the fact that …rst period player 2 does not play H. The myopic action is not selected because the …rst period player 1 selecting D forfeits reputation in the second period and it is su¢ciently valuable. For case (iii), only m displays P 1. This asymmetry arises because M does not …nd it pro…table to maintain its reputation. For case (iv), neither player selects H in the …rst period as a player 1 because of the high likelihood of being matched with a biased player. No unbiased agent plays H as a second period player 1 unless the opponent has played D in the …rst period. (1) = 1, i 2 (h j ) = 1 for h j = 2 HH.
Proposition 4 If
For intermediate b, the minority …nds it pro…table to play H as a player 2 with probability strictly between 0 and 1 in order to enter the next period with a posterior of b 1 b . Unlike m, M never …nds it pro…table to play H as a …rst period player 2 even if it secures a posterior of 1 in the second period. Therefore, m displays P 2 and M does not. Note that by Lemma 2, we can restrict attention to < b 1 b 2 and therefore every agent plays H as a …rst period player 1. By being able to restrict attention to < b 1 b 2 we do not have the number of cases that we had in the Proposition 3. Every …rst period player demands H and in the second period demands H in response to a history of H1 as the probability of a biased player is su¢ciently low.
Proposition 5 If b > 2 (1 )(1 ) + 1 > 2
(1 ) + 1 then the SP BE must be that m 2 (HH) = 1 1 ( 1 2 )(b 1)(1 ) , M 2 (HH) = 1 1 ( 2 )(b 1)(1 ) , i 1 (H) = 2 (0; 1) such that p i (HH) = b 1 b and i 2 (h j ) = 1 where h j 2 fI; E; H1g and i 1 (1) = 1.
For large b, both groups exhibit P 2. Much of the reasoning above involving m now holds for both groups. Again, by Lemma 2, we restrict attention to < b 1 b 2 . Both groups play H as a player 1 in the …rst period and play H as a second period player 1 against a player with a history of H1.
Propositions 3, 4 and 5 characterize the SP BE. Figure 6 demonstrates, given a value of , the regions of b and which are consistent with a SP BE.
FIGURE 6 HERE
The northwest portion of the graph corresponds to the values of b and which yield the SP BE as described in Proposition 5. In other words, for high b and low , both groups exhibit P 2. The band to the right of this corresponds to the parameters which yield the SP BE as described in Proposition 4. To the right of this band, there are three small bands which correspond to the parameters which yield the SP BE as described in Proposition 3 (i), (ii) and (iii). Finally, the southeast portion of the graph corresponds to the values of b and which yield the SP BE as described in Proposition 3 (iv).
We now provide the following example in order to facilitate a more intuitive understanding of the model. While we vary b, we assume speci…c values for and . In the …rst case (b = 3) neither group displays P 2, in the second case (b = 5) only the minority displays P 2 and in the …nal case (b = 7) both groups display P 2.
Example 1 Consider an SP BE where the majority group composes 60% of the population ( = 0:6), each group contains a 10% fraction of biased players ( = 0:1) and the prize b is either 3, 5, or 7:
(i) In the case that b = 3, the SP BE strategies look similar to that of the unperturbed game. 19 The only di¤erence being that those matched with a player who played H as a player 2 in the …rst period will play D as a player 1. The SP BE strategies are: (1 )(1 ) + 1 6:6) the minority (majority) has no incentive to deviate from i 1 (H) = 0. Here, in both majority and minority groups, only biased players destroy surplus.
(ii) In the case that b = 5 the incentives (and therefore …rst period strategies) are identical to the b = 3 case for M , but not for m. Here m 1 (H) = 0 cannot be part of an SP BE.
However it also cannot be that m 1 (H) = 1 because this would imply p m (HH) = and thus M 2 (HH) = 0 for M as < b 1 b . Therefore m 1 (H) must be such that p m (HH) = b 1 b = 4 5 . This is the posterior which makes the agent as a player 1 indi¤erent between H and D. This mixing probability occurs at m 1 (H) = (1 )(b 1) = 0:028. (iii) In the case that b = 7, both m and M will mix such that p i (h) = 6 7 . This mixing probability occurs at i 1 (H) = 0:0185. Similarly both groups must mix as a second period player 2 in order to keep the …rst period player 2 indi¤erent between playing H and D against an H.
SPBE Results
We now characterize some basic properties of the SP BE. We illustrate the underlying asymmetry in payo¤s by showing that the majority always does strictly better for parameter values such that both groups have identical equilibrium strategies. We also show that reputation is always more valuable for the minority players. Hence, we …nd that minority players will always exhibit weakly more aggressive behavior in the …rst period, than do majority players. 20
Although the SP BE is generically unique, depending on the particular parameters of the game, the equilibrium can have signi…cantly di¤erent properties. For some parameter values, SP BE strategies and therefore equilibrium payo¤s can exhibit some asymmetry. However, there is also a basic asymmetry inherent in our model, which is best illustrated when attention is restricted to strongly symmetric strategies -that is, …rst period strategy pro…les which are identical across groups. This motivates the following de…nition:
De…nition 6 Let be the SP BE of : Then is strongly symmetric if the …rst period strategies in can be written without reference to group membership.
We say that a game is strongly symmetric if its parameters are such that all players have identical …rst period equilibrium strategies. However, even in such a markedly symmetric environment, the majority does strictly better than the minority, as the next result shows. 21
Proposition 6 If is strongly symmetric, the majority has a strictly higher ex-ante payo¤ than the minority.
This result follows from the fact that majority group members are more likely to be in an ingroup match than minority group members. If is strongly symmetric, an ingroup match is more pro…table than an outgroup match. Additionally, the posteriors for a given history are identical across groups which implies that second period strategies are also identical. These facts combine to produce the result.
Note that this result crucially depends on the existence of the biased players ( > 0). In the unperturbed game, members of both groups have an expected payo¤ of b + 1. Therefore if there are biased players then we observe no payo¤ di¤erences based on group membership.
Although Proposition 6 demonstrates that for strongly symmetric , the majority always does better than the minority, the majority can do worse if the equilibrium strategies across groups are su¢ciently asymmetric. We now present an example of such an SP BE where the minority has a larger expected payo¤ than the majority.
Example 2 Suppose that = 0:6, b = 2, and = 0:55. The SP BE which corresponds to these parameter values is described by Proposition 3 (iii). In this SP BE the minority displays P 1 and the majority does not. Therefore, the SP BE is not strongly symmetric. If we let E i represent the ex-ante payo¤ of player i, then it follows that:
The above example demonstrates the necessity of the strong symmetry assumption in Proposition 6. The intuition behind Example 2 is that the majority does not obtain a reputation while the minority does. Hence, the minority does su¢ciently better than the majority in outgroup matches and so the minority does better overall.
In Example 2, the minority exhibits more aggressive behavior in the …rst period than does the majority. This is a general feature of the SP BE, as we show in the next proposition. Speci…cally, we show that the minority is always at least as likely as the majority to play H as a …rst period player 1 and player 2.
Proposition 7 In every generic SP BE, a minority member m plays at least as aggressively as a majority member M :
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is that reputation is more valuable to the minority than the majority, as the former is more likely to be in a second period outgroup match. Note that we assume very little asymmetry between the groups; we assume uniform matching, an equal probability of being a player 1 and 2 in each period for both groups, and an equal fraction of biased players in each group. The only assumed asymmetry relates to the composition of society. One could imagine a situation where these symmetry assumptions are not appropriate. However, the purpose of this paper is to investigate social outcomes when assuming as little between group asymmetry as possible. Therefore, we do not explore these issues.
We interpret Proposition 7 to be consistent with psychology literature related to the group identity of majorities and minorities. Psychologists …nd that minorities have a stronger group identity than do majorities. 22 As a result of this stronger identity, we expect stronger behavior; and in the context of our model, stronger behavior means more aggressive play.
Concluding Remarks
We have modeled a social setting containing some agents as described by our interpretation of the social identity literature. We have demonstrated that the struggle for resources, in the presence of agents with a taste for discrimination, can induce agents without such a taste to aggressively discriminate. The paper showed that for games which induce a su¢ciently symmetric equilibrium, the majority has a greater ex-ante payo¤ than the minority. Additionally, we showed that the minority always plays the game at least as aggressively as the majority. We interpret this result as consistent with the experimental …ndings that minorities have stronger group identities than do majorities.
We showed that our model is consistent with empirical papers which …nd a relationship between social con ‡ict and a measure of the social heterogeneity. Our results are also consistent with the literature identifying a relationship between social con ‡ict and the inequitability of the environment. Indeed our model provides an individually rational explanation for these results. One possible alternative explanation for the empirical results is that every member of the society has a preference for better material outcomes for ingroup members, however the fraction of agents intransigently playing H in outgroup matches is increasing in b or 1 . We regard our explanation as superior to this alternate explanation, as the latter e¤ectively assumes the result.
It should be noted that there remain interesting, unanswered questions. For instance, it could be fruitful to investigate a model in which information is less than perfect. Obviously some information is required for these results to hold, however it might prove productive to investigate weaker assumptions. It would also be interesting to model the presence of three of more groups. It could be the case that there is be an interaction among the groups which is not present with only two groups.
In light of the recent interest in fairness, it is useful to note that there exist aspects of every society which could be described as unfair. In every society, economic inequalities persist on the basis of race, religion and gender. We argue that, in economic situations, unfairness is at least as important than fairness. It is also our opinion that the social identity literature is useful in providing direction for the study of unfairness.
Appendix
The appendix is arranged as follows. First we prove some technical results which we use subsequently. Then we prove our characterization of the SP BE where it is unique (Propositions 3, 4 and 5). Next we prove Proposition 7 then Proposition 1. Finally we characterize the SP BE where it is not unique (Proposition 8).
Before we begin, note that characterizing the SP BE boils down to characterizing i 1 (1), i 1 (H) and i 2 (h j ) for all i 2 M (m), j 2 m(M ) and all h j 2 H. Also, we de…ne v i (h i ) as the expected payo¤ of i entering period 2 with a history of h i . The di¤erence in continuation payo¤s can be summarized by the di¤erence in expected payo¤s as a second period player 2 as strategy for an ingroup and outgroup as a player 1 are independent of the player's own history. The following two lemmas provide useful technical results and together prove Lemma 1.
With a domain of 2 [0:5; 1], the right hand side of (1) attains a maximum at = 1. Therefore,
Notice that for all b > 1
and so (2) implies that if b 1 b 2 then it must be that > (b 1) 2 (b 1) . Therefore, the lemma is proved.
(1 ) + 1) if and only if M (m) does not exhibit P 2.
Proof: It must be that M 1 (H) > 0 if and only if
The left side represents the expected utility heading into the second period with a posterior of 1 and the right side represents the expected utility entering the second period known to be unbiased. The analogous reasoning holds for m. (1 )(1 ) + 1) is a necessary condition for m (M ) to display P 2. This is the lower bound of b for which a player would sacri…ce an immediate payo¤ of 1 in order to …nd entering the second period with a posterior of 1. This allows us to restrict attention to the SP BE which contains P 2 to < b 1 b 2 . Furthermore, note that the second condition for P 1 requires that (1 )(1 j 1 (H))b < 1. This implies that P 1 only occurs when
In other words, there are no parameter values for which the SP BE exhibits both P 1 and P 2, which proves Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 3:
In any SP BE with
it must be that i 1 (H) = 0, by Lemma 3. This implies posteriors of p i (h i ) = 1 for h i = HH and p i (h i ) = 0 for h i = DH and strategies j (h i ) = 0 for h i = HH. If i 1 (H) = 0 then p(HH) = 1 and therefore i 2 (HH) = 0. It also must be that i 2 (h j 1 ) = 1 if h j 1 2 H D . Furthermore, there can be no other SP BE strategies.
(i) It will be that i 2 (h j ) = 1 if h j 2 fI; Eg because p j (h j ) = < b 1 b . It remains to determine i 1 (1) and i 2 (H1). It cannot be that i 1 (1) = 0 as this would imply that p i (H1) = 1 and j 2 (H1) = 0. However, a deviation is easy to …nd as both the …rst period stage game payo¤s are higher for H:
and
because p i (H1) = 1 > b 1 b > p i (D1) = 0. Therefore, i 1 (1) 6 = 0. It cannot be that i 1 (1) = 2 (0; 1) because the …rst period player 1 cannot be indi¤erent between playing H and D as a player 1. Therefore, i 1 (1) = 1 and p i (H1) = so that i 2 (h j ) = 1. Furthermore, there can be no other SP BE strategies.
(ii) Here it cannot be that i 1 (1) = 0 as this would imply that p i (H1) = 1, i 2 (h j ) = 0 for h j = H1. However, a deviation exists for M :
And similarly for m:
. Therefore, i 1 (1) > 0 despite the fact that the …rst period stage game payo¤ for D is greater than that of H for a player 1 of both groups. Hence, both m and M display P 1. It also cannot be that i 1 (1) 2 (0; 1). In order for the …rst period player 1 to mix, it would require:
Since
Therefore, the only way to satisfy (6) is to select j 2 (h i ) for h i = H1 such that p i (H1) = b 1 b and this is impossible given that the prior is strictly greater than
Therefore, the optimal choice is i 1 (1) = 1 and as a consequence j 2 (h i ) = 0 for h i = H1. It also follows that since > b 1 b that i 2 (h j ) = 0 for h j 2 fI; Eg. Indeed, this last fact holds for the …nal three sections of the proof. Furthermore, there can be no other SP BE strategies.
(iii) Since 2 ( M ; m ) we can make identical arguments as those given in part (ii) only for m and not M . Therefore m 1 (1) = 1 and M (h m ) = 0 such that h m = H1. In the case of M , it cannot be that M 1 (1) = 1 because (5) no longer holds. It cannot be that M 1 (1) 2 (0; 1) because (6) cannot be satis…ed by any value in this range. Therefore, M 1 (1) = 0 and m 2 (h M ) = 0 for h M = H1 as p M (H1) = 1 as it is no longer for worthwhile for M to display P 1. Furthermore, there can be no other SP BE strategies.
(iv) Now the arguments supporting i 1 (1) 2 (0; 1] in cases (ii) and (iii) do not hold for either group. Therefore, i 1 (1) = 0 and i 2 (h j ) = 0 for h j = H1 as p i (H1) = 1. It is no longer for either group to display P 1. Furthermore, there can be no other SP BE strategies.
Proof of Proposition 4:
In any SP BE with 2 (1 )(1 ) + 1 > b > 2
(1 ) + 1, it must be that m 1 (H) = 2 (0; 1) such that p m (HH) = b 1 b and M 1 (H) = 0. By Lemma 3, it cannot be that M 1 (H) > 0. Therefore, M 1 (H) = 0 and m 2 (h M ) = 0 when h M = HH. In the case of m, it cannot be that m 1 (H) = 0. It also cannot be that m 1 (H) = 1 as this implies that p m (HH) = < b 1 b and so v m (HH) = v m (DH). Therefore, m 1 (H) = 0 is a pro…table deviation. It must be that m
There would be no bene…t for m 1 (H) > 0, and so it must be that m 1 (H) . If m 1 (H) < then p m (HH) > b 1 b which would imply that M 2 (h m ) = 0 where h m = HH. However, if M 2 (h m ) = 0 where h m = HH then m 1 (H) = 1 is optimal. By the above argument this cannot be the case, therefore m 1 (H) = . The SP BE requires
2 . Furthermore, m 1 (1) = 1 and M 2 (h m ) = 1 for h m = H1. This is true as v m (H1) = v m (D1) and b(1 ) > 1. Furthermore, there can be no other SP BE strategies.
Proof of Proposition 5: In any SP BE with b 2 (1 )(1 ) + 1 > 2
(1 ) + 1, it must be that i 1 (H) = 2 (0; 1) such that p i (HH) = b 1 b . Here, the argument presented in the proof of Proposition 4 goes through for both M and m. It also must be that i 2 (h j ) 2 (0; 1) where h j = HH. Just as in Proposition 4, in order to determine M 2 (HH) it must be that then there is no bene…t to foregoing payment in the …rst period because p i (HH) = < b 1 b . Furthermore, arguments advanced in the Proof of Proposition 4 show that if i 1 (H) 2 (0; 1) then it must be that i 1 (H) = such that p i (HH) = b 1 b . Therefore, i 1 (H) 2 f0; g. To satisfy the inequality it must be that M 1 (H) = > m 1 (H) = 0. In order to support this SP BE it must be that
and therefore
= 1 is not satis…ed by any
Therefore, the only remaining case for < b 1 b is:
A deviation of m would imply p m (H1) = 1 and therefore, v m (H1) > v m (D1). This leads to a contradiction as it cannot be that
Therefore, M 1 (1) m 1 (1) for generic parameter values.
Proof of Proposition 1: For every set of parameter values (b; ; ), the statement of Propositions 3, 4 and 5 map to the corresponding values of I. Therefore in the proof of Proposition 1, we note the trajectory of I, given b and , as varies. As 1 changes, the incentives for each group changes. Speci…cally, as 1 gets larger, the minority reputation becomes less valuable and the majority reputation becomes more valuable. As 1 becomes large one of the following three possibilities occur. In the …rst case, no qualitative change occurs in the SP BE. In the second case, the majority does not exhibit reputation whereas the minority exhibits reputation for small 1 and for large values does not exhibit reputation. In the third case, the minority always exhibits reputation and for small 1 the majority does not display reputation and for large values, the majority does display reputation. Now we characterize the relationship between I and 1 for every pair of (b; ). If b 2+(1 ) 3(1 ) , then for all values of 1 , it will be that I = (b + 1) (1 )[4 2 ]. This implies that for values of (b; ) in this region I is strictly increasing and continuous in 1 . Therefore 1 = 0:5. If b 2 ( 2+(1 ) 3(1 ) ; 4+(1 ) 5(1 ) ) then for small values of 1 it will be that I = (b + 1) (1 )[ (1+3 )] and for large values of 1 it will be that I = (b+1) (1 )[4 2 ]. Intuitively, for small 1 the minority exhibits P 1. However, for large 1 , it is no longer pro…table for the minority to exhibit P 1. This downward discontinuity occurs at 1 such that b = 2+ (1 ) (2+ )(1 ) . Note that at this downward discontinuity the minority is indi¤erent between displaying P 1 or not. Therefore,
(1 ) and this is strictly larger than zero.
for all values of 1 . This implies that for values of (b; ) such that b = 4+(1 ) 5(1 ) then I is strictly increasing and continuous in 1 . Therefore, 1 = 0:5. If b 2 ( 4+(1 ) 5(1 ) ; 1 1 ) then for small values 1 it will be that I = (b + 1) (1 )[ (1 + 3 )] and for large values of 1 it will be that I = (b + 1) (1 )2 (1 + ). Intuitively, for small 1 the majority does not exhibit P 1 however for large 1 the reputation of the majority becomes su¢ciently pro…table to display P 1. This upward discontinuity occurs at 1 such that b = 2+(1 )(1 )
(3 )(1 ) . Note that at this discontinuity, the majority is indi¤erent between displaying P 1 or not. Thus, (1 )(1 ) (3 )(1 ) . As there is a single upward discontinuity and is increasing at every point of continuity therefore 1 = 0:5. If b = 1 1 then for all values of 1 it will be that I 2 [(b + 1) (1 )[ (1 + 3 )]; (b + 1) (1 ) (3:5 + 0:5 )]. Note that for these particular values of b and any value of I in the above speci…ed region will su¢ce. However, given any second period strategies for the histories I, H1 or E, ine¢ciency is increasing and continuous in 1 . Therefore, 1 = 0:5. If b 2 ( 1 1 ; 2 1 +1] then for all values of 1 it will be that I = (b+1) (1 ) (3:5+0:5 ). This implies that for values of (b; ) in this region I is strictly increasing and continuous in 1
. Therefore, 1 = 0:5. If b 2 ( 2 1 + 1; 4 1 + 1) then for small values of 1 it will be that I = (b + 1) (1 ) (3:5+ 2 + 1 2 ) and for large values of 1 it will be that I = (b+1) (1 ) (3:5+0:5 ). Intuitively, for small 1 the minority exhibits P 2 and for large 1 the minority does not exhibit P 2. This boundary occurs at 1 2 (0; 0:5) such that b = 2 (1 ) + 1. Although the minority is indi¤erent between exhibiting P 2 or not, it is not the case that any combination will su¢ce. Therefore, at 1 00 where b = 2 (1 ) + 1, the minority either exhibits P 2 or not: I 2 f(b + 1) (1 ) (3:5 + 0:5 ); (b + 1) (1 ) (3:5 + 2 + 1 2 )g. Due to the particular behavior of (b + 1) (1 ) (3:5 + 2 + 1 2 ) we denote its interior maximum as
. The quantity 1 0 is increasing from 0:4833 when = 0 to 0:5 when = 1. Therefore, 1 = minf1 0 ; 1 00 g and this is bounded away from zero.
+1 then for all values of 1 it will be that I = (b+1) (1 ) (3:5+ 2 + 1 2 ). This implies that for values of b and in this region I is strictly increasing and continuous in 1 . Therefore, 1 = 1 0 If b 2 ( 4 1 +1; 1) then for small values of 1 it will be that I = (b+1) (1 ) (3:5+ 2 + 1 2
) and for large values of 1 it will be that (b+1) (1 )4 . Intuitively, for small 1 the majority does not …nd it pro…table to exhibit P 2 however for large 1 the reputation of the majority becomes su¢ciently pro…table. This upward discontinuity occurs at 1 such that b = 2 (1 )(1 ) + 1. Although the majority is indi¤erent between exhibiting P 2 or not, it is not the case that any combination will su¢ce. Therefore, the majority either exhibits P 2 or not: I 2 f(b + 1) (1 ) (3:5 + 2 ); (b + 1) (1 )4 g at 1 where b = 2 (1 )(1 ) + 1. Therefore, 1 = 1 0 .
Therefore, for every value of (b; ) there exists 1 > 0 such that for all 1 < 1 , ine¢ciency I is increasing in 1 .
Non-generic parameter values
The SP BE is generically unique, as the following corollary shows. Following the corollary, is a result which describes the SP BE for non-generic parameter values. There exists a set , of measure zero, in the parameter space for which the SP BE is not unique. For parameter values not contained in , the SP BE is unique. We explicitly de…ne as = f(b; ; ) : b 2 f 2 (1 ) + 1; 2 (1 )(1 ) + 1g
The following corollary follows from Propositions 3, 4 and 5.
Corollary 2 If parameters (b, , ) are not contained in the set then the satisfying the conditions for SP BE will be unique.
Lemma 2 demonstrates that either a condition for b can be satis…ed or a condition for can be satis…ed, but not both. The values of b given above are the values for which the minority (respectively majority) will be indi¤erent between displaying P 2 or not. The …rst value of represents the value for which a second period player 2 will be indi¤erent between playing H and D against an opponent with a history h such that p i (h) = . The second (and third) value(s) of denotes the parameter for which the majority (minority) is indi¤erent between displaying P 1 and not. Now, we characterize the SP BE for each element of .
Proposition 8 (a) If b < 2 (1 ) + 1 and = b 1 b then the SP BE is not unique as the strategies speci…ed in Proposition 3 (i) or (ii) or any mixture will su¢ce.
(b) If b < 2
(1 ) + 1 and = b 1+( 1 2 )(b 1) b+( 1 2 )(b 1) then the SP BE is not unique as the strategies speci…ed for M in Proposition 3 (ii) or (iii) or any mixture will su¢ce.
(c) If b < 2
(1 ) + 1 and = b 1+( 2 )(b 1) b+( 2 )(b 1) then the SP BE is not unique as the strategies speci…ed for m in Proposition 3 (iii) or (iv) or any mixture will su¢ce.
(d) If b = 2 (1 ) + 1 then the SP BE is not unique as the strategies speci…ed for m in Proposition 4 and those speci…ed in Proposition 3 (i), however no mixture between them will su¢ce.
(e) If b = 2 (1 )(1 ) + 1 then the SP BE is not unique as the strategies speci…ed for M in Proposition 5 and those speci…ed in Proposition 4, however no mixture between them will su¢ce.
Proof: In the case of (a), any i 2 (h) 2 [0; 1] where h such that p j (h) = is an SP BE. For such histories, the second period player 2 is indi¤erent between actions. For histories I, H1 and E any second period strategies will su¢ce. In the case of (b), the majority is indi¤erent between displaying P 1 or not. Any M 1 (1) 2 [0; 1] will constitute an SP BE. These …rst period player 1 strategies will induce posteriors strictly between and 1. Therefore, the second period strategies are unchanged. In the case of (c), the minority is indi¤erent between displaying P 1 or not. Reasoning similar to case (b) applies to m. In the case of (d), the minority is indi¤erent between displaying P 2 or not. However, unlike the previous cases, the SP BE cannot contain any mixture between the equilibria will not form a SP BE. Given condition (iii) of the de…nition of SP BE it must be either m 1 (H) 2 f0; (1 )(b 1) g. Any other value would imply p m (HH) 6 = b 1 b . Unlike the cases of (a), (b), and (c), the …rst period strategy nontrivially a¤ects the second period posteriors, as < b 1 b . For the parameter values given, there is no deviation from the m strategy given in Proposition 4. Likewise, there is no deviation from the strategy given in Proposition 3(i). In the case of (e), the majority is indi¤erent between displaying P 2 or not. Reasoning similar to case (d) applies to M .
The statement of Proposition 8 elucidates Figure 5 in the body of the paper. In this …gure, the relationship between I and b is connected at 3 points of discontinuity ((a), (b) and (c)) and not connected at two points of discontinuity ((d) and (e)). 
